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Time for the Creation of a Standing U.N. Armed
Peace Service and the Potential Employment of
Experienced U.S. Veterans as a Significant
Component of Such a Force
RONALD SIEVERT*

"We must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham,
that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words. .. ."I

Winston Churchill, speaking of the U.N. Fulton, Missouri 1946
I.

History

Since its inception, the founders of the United Nations (U.N.) envisioned
agreements among nations that would establish a responsive, proactive
military force that could take action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
"as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security."2 But the Cold War immediately intervened, and when the
Military Staff Committee established by the Charter3 first met in 1946, it
found significant disagreements among the permanent five members of the
4
Security Council as to the size, composition, and basing of such a force.
Then U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie proposed, in succession, a U.N.
Guard Force, a U.N. Legion, and a U.N. Volunteer Reserve to at least
maintain peace and perform constabulary functions pursuant to Chapter VI.5
The U.N. abandoned even these less ambitious plans, however, because the
plans received no support. 6 The United States and USSR were concerned
that a permanent force might act against their interests, especially in the
* Professor of National Security and International Law, George H.W. Bush School of
Government and University of Texas School of Law, J.D. University of Texas 1977. The author
would like to thank graduate assistant Emiley Pagrabs, Master's in International Affairs Bush
School 2018, for her research and editorial assistance in support of this article.
1. Winston Churchill, Speech in Fulton, Missouri on the UN (Mar. 5, 1946), in MARTIN
GILBERT, NEVER DESPAIR: WINSTON CHURCHILL 1945-1965, 199 (Heinemann 1988).
2. U.N. Charter art. 42. See Adam Roberts, Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical
History, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT
AND PRACTICE SINCE

1945, 101 102 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).

3. U.N. Charter art. 47.
4. Roberts, supra note 2, at 100.
5. Dan Hayes Griffith, Improving United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability: is a volunteer
rapid reaction force the answer? 7-8 (2008) (unpublished Honors Thesis, University of Oregon)
(on file with Department of Political Science, University of Oregon).
6. Id. at 8-9.
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developing Cold War proxy wars between the two superpowers.7 The U.N.
eventually obtained Security Council authorization to dispatch troops from a
few contributing member states to act as lightly armed truce observers who
would monitor compliance with peace treaties in Palestine, the Sinai,
Kashmir, and Lebanon with the consent of the parties. 8 These troops were
generally under orders never to take the initiative in the use of armed force
and to only act in self-defense.9 At one point, however, they acted to remove
10
foreign troops and mercenaries from the Congo.
The end of the Cold War reinvigorated the original expectation that the
U.N. should have the ability to quickly field a strong force to maintain peace
and prevent aggression." Between 1988 and 1993, the Security Council
actually sanctioned twelve limited operations in "conflicts that had
[previously] been fueled by Cold War intrigue."12 But these operations were
limited in scope, and the U.N. troops were "weak[] in the face of violent
harassment ...[and stymied by] delays in getting states to contribute forces
to . . . urgent [U.N.] mission[s] .... "13 This was painfully obvious in
Cambodia, Angola, Somalia, and, perhaps above all, in the failure to
immediately act during the horribly tragic genocides in Bosnia and
Rwanda. 14 Something had to be done. Sir Brian Urquhart, echoed by the
Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo, put forth the strongest
proposals for a standing U.N. Volunteer Military Force. 15 As Urquhart
wrote:
Recent [U.N.] experiences provide a good argument for at least
considering the establishment of an immediately available dlite [U.N.]
force directly recruited from volunteers worldwide. Hitherto the
Security Council has lacked the capacity to deploy a convincing military
presence at the outset of a crisis before the situation has disintegrated
and become uncontrollable ....[This] might give the Security Council
(and the Secretary-General) the capacity to display strength and
determination at a point where larger disasters could be avoided.16
7. Id. at 7-8.
8. Id. at 6; Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces Some Legal Problems, 37 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L
351, 354 (1962).
9. Seyersted, supra note 8, at 399.
10. Id. at 397.
11. Griffith, supra note 5, at 9.
12. Id.at 9.
13. Roberts, supra note 2, at 107.
14. Id. at 107; see also IN SEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (Bullfrog Films 2005); GHOSTS
OF RWANDA (Frontline 2004).
15. Gordon Wilson, Arm in Arm After the Cold War? The Uneasy NATO-UN Relationship, 2
INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1, 91-92 (Spring 1995); see also H. PETER LANGILLE, DEVELOPING A
UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY PEACE SERVICE 55 (Palgrave Macmillan 2016); Roberts, supra
note 2, at 117.
16. Roberts, supra note 2, at 107.
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This suggestion was not limited to peacekeeping only but also envisioned a
fast military response to external threats as well as enforcing a ceasefire in an
incipient civil war.'7
The idea of a standing U.N. volunteer force, instead of calling on member
nations on an ad hoc basis, seemed to make sense on its face. As Carl Kaysen
and George Rathjens observed, nation states are naturally reluctant to supply
contingents to any mission where they perceive there is a good possibility
that their units will incur significant casualties.is In democratic societies,
politicians are very sensitive to the fact that this could cause a major backlash
against them. 19 As a result, many nations spent months debating whether
they should assist, thus slowing overall deployment time.20 The most
common contributing states to date had been developing countries (in part
motivated by U.N. funding) that lacked the well-equipped and trained
armed forces that a permanent volunteer armed force would have.21
But some experts responded that such a U.N. force would theoretically
create a disconnect between power and responsibility.22 The Security
Council would have the ability to authorize operations, but permanent
members would not have the responsibility to take any real action
themselves.23 In addition, there was overt fear of the U.N. assuming an
aggressive independent military role in world affairs as opposed to
functioning primarily as an organization who maintains peace. 24 Others
were concerned about the cost and believed an active military organization
"risk[ed] the [U.N.]'s reputation for impartiality . . . [and] could seriously
undermine the [U.N.]'s, and more especially the Secretary-General's,
reputation and capabilities."25 Some claimed that such a force could lead to
world government and an abuse of authority that would threaten the
independence of smaller nations as well as the prerogatives of major
26
powers.
17. Id. at 108.

18. Carl Kaysen & George Rathjens, The Case for a Volunteer U.N. Military Force, 132
DAEDALUS 91, 92 (2003).

19. Id. at 93.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Griffith, supra note 5, at 28.
See Wilson, supra note 15, at 92.
Id.

24.

STAFF OF THE AU STL. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEF., AND TRADE, REP. ON ALSTRALIA'S

STANDING COMM.

ON

ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS

75 (Comm. Print 2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary-Business/Committees
/House ofRepresentativesCommittees?url=JFadt/u nations/unchap4.pdf.
25. Roberts, supra note 2, at 126 28.
26. STAFF OF THE ALUSTL. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT STANDING COMM. ON
REFORM,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEF., AND TRADE, REP. ON ALSTRALIA'S

ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS

REFORM, 75, (Comm. Print 2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary-Business/
Committees/House of RepresentativesCommittees?url=JFadt/u nations/unchap4.pdf;;

Georgia Covill, Creating a UN Standing Army, 2015 COSTEAS-GEITONAS SCHOOL MODEL
UNITED NATIONS, at 1, http://cgsmun.gr/wp-contentluploads/2015/lOth/Study-Guides/
SC_2_GC.pdf; see also Gideon Rachman, Opinion, Why the world needs a United Nations army,
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Accordingly, the U.N. even gave some thought to hiring private military
7
contractors (PMCs) when needed instead of establishing a U.N. force.2
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, PMCs provided security services on a
global scale.28 They were deployed to Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Hungary,
Croatia, and Bosnia; the United States used them to outsource some aspects
of military training.29 But "evidence [had] show[n] [that] PMCs [were]
capable of human rights abuses and severe criminal acts with little or no
recourse . . .to address those violations."30 After considering PMCs as a
quick reaction force in Rwanda, Kofi Annan, then U.N. Undersecretary
General for Peacekeeping, rejected the idea, concluding that "the world may
1
not be ready to privatize peace. "3
Recognizing member states' resistance to the idea of a permanent force,
the potential issues with private corporations, and the fact that the ad hoc
system of soliciting troops at a moment of crisis was not working, Secretary
General Boutros Ghali established a U.N. Standby Arrangements System
(SAS) in the early 1990s.32 The SAS, still in place today, is "based upon
commitments by Member States to contribute specified resources within
agreed response time for [U.N.] peacekeeping operations."33 Resources
remain on standby in their home country until the Secretary-General
requests their use. 34 States still have discretion as to whether the SAS can
use their troops or resources in individual operations.35
SAS appeared to have a lot of promise at its inception; within ten years,
eighty-eight nations expressed their willingness to participate.36 But,
although there were some successes, it was increasingly obvious over time
FIN. TIMES, July 20, 2009, https://www.ft.com/content/325b3c42-7558-1Ide-9ed5-00144
feabdc0.

27. Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal For a Layered Approach to
Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U. S. F. L. REV. 825, 847 49 (2005), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=893 857.
28. Id. at 831.
29. Id. at 831-32.
30. Id. at 849.
31. Press Release, Secretary- General, Secretary- General Reflects on 'Intervention' in ThirtyFifth Annual Ditchley Foundation Lecture, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6613 (June 26, 1998).
32.

STAFF

OF THE

AtSTL.

HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

JOINT

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEF., AND TRADE, REP. ON AtSTRALIA'S

STANDING

COMM.

ON

ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS

REFORM, 75 (Comm. Print 2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary-Business/
Committees/House-of RepresentativesCommittees?url=JFadt/u nations/unchap4.pdf.
33. Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 68; Griffith, supra note 5,at 9 11.
36. STAFF OF THE AUtSTL. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOINT STANDING COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEF., AND TRADE, REP. ON AtSTRALIA'S

ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS

REFORM, 75 (Comm. Print 2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary-Business/
Committees/House of RepresentativesCommittees?url=JFadt/u nations/unchap4.pdf;
Amanda Lieverse, A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations: Past Failures and
Future Possibilities, 45 53 (2006) (unpublished Honors Thesis, University of Manitoba) (on file
with Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba).
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that states have chronically failed to deploy forces in a timely manner. 37 In
2000, the U.N. Panel on Peace Operations issued the Brahimi report
(named after panel chairman Lakhdar Brahimi) concluding that the failure of
states to meet their commitments, shortages of well-trained troops, and poor
access to necessary material and resources prevented rapid and effective
3
peacekeeper deployment. 1
A stop-gap emerged in 2000 with the implementation of a Danish
proposal to create a U.N. Standby Forces Brigade at High Readiness
(SHIRBRIG) composed of 5,000 troops from sixteen states.39 This force
was for U.N. peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI only and still relied
on the consent of the parties as well as a nation-state's willingness to
participate on a case by case basis.40 The U.N. deployed 1,200-1,500
SHIRBRIG troops to Eritrea and Ethiopia with some success, but the U.N.
abandoned the Brigade in 2009 due to the failure of members to meet
pledges of actual military support. 41 As noted by Denmark's Defense
Minister, "in the case of SHIRBRIG, either member countries were unable
to relinquish the troops needed[,] or if soldiers finally were provided,
countries wanted specific influence over [exactly] how they were put to
use. "42
With the continuing sting and embarrassment of the U.N.'s failure to
intervene in the Balkans and Rwanda, the General Assembly in 2005
endorsed the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).43 Pillar One of
R2P notes that every nation has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.44
Pillar Three, however, states that if a country "is manifestly failing to protect
its populations, the international community must be prepared to take
appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in
accordance with the [U.N.] Charter."45
R2P clearly provided greater incentive for the U.N. to, at the very least,
make the Standby Arrangements System work. Nevertheless, as recently as
2015, the U.N.'s High-Level Panel on Peace Operations concluded that:
37. Griffith, supra note 5, at 10.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Lieverse, supra note 36, at 43.
40. Roberts, supra note 2, at 119 20.
41. Walter C. Soderlund, Professor Emeritus, Dep't of Political Sci. Univ. of Windsor, The
Responsibility to Prevent: From Identification to Implementation, Presentation at The Annual
Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association (June 4 6, 2013), https://www.cpsaacsp.ca/papers-2013/Soderlund.pdf.
42. Jonas von Freiesleben, Denmark Remains Committed to UN Peacekeeping
but is
Contemplating SHIRBRIG Pull-Out, CTR. FOR UN REFORm EDLC. (Aug. 6, 2008), http://
www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/359.
43. See About R2P, GLOB. CTR. ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://
www.globalr2p.org/about-r2p (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).

44. Id.
45. Id.
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Slow deployment is one of the greatest impediments to more effective
peace operations .... The [U.N.] Security Council has no standing
army to call upon. Reliance on ad hoc solutions for rapidly deploying
new missions and for crisis response has limited the timeliness and
effectiveness of international response ....[R]epeated calls for a global
on-call standby capacity have foundered time and again on concerns
46
about predictability, availability and CoSt.
Rather than recommending a permanent standing U.N. force, as
previously suggested by Urquart, the Panel instead recommended that
7
regional forces, such as the European and African Union, step up. 4
Regional forces eventually intervened in the Balkans with the insertion of
NATO forces4 8 and in the Congo with active operations of the U.N.
Intervention Brigade.49 But the world watched for many years as Serbia
undertook ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo,50 and rebel groups
committed atrocities in the Congo5' before these regional organizations
finally took action. African Union troops deployed to Somalia were "simply
inadequate,"52 while in Mali, deployment was slow and the force small and
untrained.53 As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated:
We have been talking for some time about the need for the [U.N.] and
key regional actors to be able to deploy more rapidly, especially in acute
emergencies. The EU Battlegroup was created for this purpose, as was
the African Standby force. But despite years of investment, we are still
far from having predictable and effective mechanisms for rapid
deployment.54
46. Rep. of the High-level Indep. Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for
peace: politics, partnership and people, TT 195 196, U.N. Doc. A/70/95 (June 17, 2015).
47. See LANGILLE, supra note 15, at 14; see also Shibley Telhami, Is a Standing United Nations
Army Possible Or Desirable, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 673, 6808 1 (1995).
48. See MARK JANIS & JoHN NoYEs, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND COMMENTARY,
657 63, 657 (4th ed. 2011) (contains an excellent history of NATOs indecisiveness and foot
dragging in the Balkans).
49. Nicholas Kulish & Somini Sengupta, New UN Brigades Aggressive Stance in Africa Brings
Success and Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/
africa/new-un-brigades-aggressive -stance -in-africa-brings -success -and-risks.html.
50. JANIS & NOYES, supra note 48, at 659.
51. See Congo: War Crimes in Kisangani, Implicated Commanders Named, HU MAN RIGHTS

(Aug. 20, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/20/congo-war-crimes-kisangani
(last visited Oct. 1, 2018); see also Julie Reynaert, Editorial, MONUS/MONUSCO and Civilian
WATCH,

Protection in the Kivus,

INT'L PEACE INFO. SERV.,

(Mar. 2, 2011), http://reliefweb.int/sites/

reliefweb.int/files/resources/D 11C9B 161C343539C1257847004BF8BF-FullReport.pdf

(It

took ten years before the Intervention Brigade was dispatched).
52. Rachman, supra note 26.
53. Matthew Willis, Occasional Paper, Mali: The Case for A Permanent UN Intervention Force?,

RUSI, 2 5 (July 2013), https://rusi.org/sites/defaultlfiles/201307-opunshield.pdf.
54. U.N. Secretary- General, Remarks at the Security Council's open debate on "United
Nations Peacekeeping; Regional Partnerships and Its Evolution" (July 28, 2014U.N.), https://
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In light of this history, including the recent failures of SAS and regional
forces, conflict resolution scholar Peter Langille proposed a United Nations
Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS).55 As explained at length in his 2016
book, Developing a United Nations Emergency Peace Service, UNEPS would be
a well-qualified and dedicated U.N. force composed of approximately 14,000
or greater if needed, volunteer civilian, police, and military professionals
who are selected, trained, and employed by the U.N.56 It would be
multidimensional and multifunctional, capable of aggressive military
7
operations as well as humanitarian, health, and environmental missions5
UNEPS would prepare deployable personnel, equipment, and supplies for
prompt staging on short notice from designated U.N. operational bases.58
Reviewing prior opposition to such a force, Langille notes that UNEPS
members would be highly trained and could rely on the lessons learned from
the considerable, difficult experience the U.N. has had in previous
peacekeeping deployments.59 As for undermining the U.N.'s reputation and
impartiality, he argues that the use of force, when needed, would be to
"support peace processes, protect civilians, and fulfill legitimate
international mandates."60 "Overall, the [U.N.]'s reputation has not
diminished from the [U.N.]'s use of force, but it has suffered from the
reluctance and failure to use force when it could have saved thousands of
'
lives, even hundreds of thousands."61
Langille acknowledges that one of the key objections to such a force is
cost as "[a]usterity is a [U.N.] priority and departments are [constantly]
ordered to 'do more with less.' "62 But he convincingly argues that "when
delays on securing approval and deployment fail to stem violence, there tend
to be far higher [financial and humanitarian] costs and lower prospects of
success."63 To cite one example, General Dallaire, who commanded the
small U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda, claimed that:
[P]rompt access to a force of 5,000 well-trained soldiers could have
prevented much of the genocide. In response to pleas for further
troops, which might have cost US $200-300 million, the international
community simply delayed for three months. After initially refusing to
help, while 800,000 people were slaughtered, it then poured several
billion dollars into relief for refugees and reconstruction aid. Yet, the
www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2014-07- 28/remarks-security-council-open-debateunited-nations -peacekeeping.
55. LANGILLE, supra note 15, at vii.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 2 3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2, 4.
Id. at 60 80 (Langille reviews opposition and provides response; capabilities are reviewed

at 61 67).

60. Id. at 66.
61. LANGUILLE, supra note 15, at 65.
62. Id. at 74.
63. Id. at 76. See also costs addressed at 73 80.
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violence triggered in Rwanda did not stop there as the armed conflict
gradually spilled over into neighboring states .... 64
Langille notes that the same "familiar pattern" followed in the Congo,
Darfur, and Central African Republic.65 "It is reasonable to assume that
those responsible for planning [such] violent actions might be deterred from
such behavior if the [U.N.] had ready access to a mechanism that could not
only thwart their plans, but hold them accountable for their actions."66 In
this latter respect, the international criminal tribunals and International
Criminal Court (ICC) can be an important deterrent, but the ICC itself
lacks a police force of its own. 67 "UNEPS could serve in this capacity,
representing both the psychological and physical presence required to
uphold international law."68
Of course, if UNEPS is deployed by the Security Council under Langille's
plan, one is always concerned about historical instances of the veto
preventing the Security Council from acting. The Council's "members have
different interests and views, making rapid agreement on action hard to
secure."69 But the Security Council's unanimous votes since the end of the
Cold War concerning the invasion of Kuwait,70 terrorism,71 and especially
the concepts promulgated by the Responsibility to Protect 72 and the 2004
U.N. Panel on Threats and Challenges,73 offer hope that the Security
Council may not be an obstacle in every case. Recognizing that the
permanent members' veto power was necessary to establish the U.N., the
Panel on Threats and Challenges nevertheless concluded:
[A]s a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character
that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age
and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital
interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members,
in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the
use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights
abuses.74
64. Id. at 74 75.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 77.
67. LANGILLE, supra note 15, at 77.
68. Id.; see also Ron Sievert, A New Perspective on the ICC: Why the Right Should Embrace the ICC
and How America Can Use It, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 79 (2006).
69. Roberts, supra note 2, at 127.
70. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
71. S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
72. Responsibility to Protect, U.N. OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND RESP. TO PROTECT,
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html
(last visited
Oct. 15, 2018).
73. U.N. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World; Our
Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).

74. Id. T 256.
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The existence of UNEPS or a similar permanent force would likely make
the exercise of the veto even less likely, as "for the Security Council, the
'will' to do a job often depends on having an appropriate tool for the job,
preferably one that is readily available and reliable."5 In the words of
Professor Juan Mendez:
If the [U.N.] had at its disposal a deployment-ready force with both
military and civilian capabilities, trained on the basis of the accumulated
experience of previous peace-keeping operations, it would be less
possible to allege that the international community's hands are tied, and
less likely that the lack of political will to act, will again condemn us to
frustration.76

II. The United States As a Primary Source of Recruits for a
Permanent Force
A review of previous history, as well as the arguments in support of a
permanent U.N. peace force, leads to the inescapable conclusion that we
should witness the creation of such an organization at some point in the near
future. One cannot predict the time, but it would appear to be part of the
necessary and inevitable flow of events. In contemplating the formation of
this force, it is hard to imagine a better recruiting source to help fill the
ranks than U.S. military veterans. The U.S. armed forces are well regarded
as probably the best trained troops in the world.77 More veterans are
available as the military has decreased in size from 2.1 million to 1.3 million
in the last twenty-five years,7 8with a 100,000 reduction since just 2004. 79 It
is estimated that there will be approximately 2.1 million retirees by 2020.80
A very significant number were previously deployed to the Middle East,
75.

LANGILLE, supra note

15, at 69 70.

76. Juan Mendez, Prevention of Genocide and Its Challenges, in STANDING
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 44, 45 (Global Action to Prevent War 2009).

FOR CHANGE IN

77. Jeremy Bender, Ranked: The World's Strongest Militaries, Buss. INSIDER, (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015 -9/
#20-canada-1; Logan Nye, Top Ten Militaries in the World 2017, MILITARY.COM (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.military.com/undertheradar/2017/08/top- 10 -militaries-world-2017.
78. Kim Parker, Anthony Cilluffo, & Renee Stepler, 6 Facts about the US Military and its
Changing Demographics,PEW RES. CTR (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/04/13/6 -facts -about-the-u-s-military-and -its-changing-demographics/
(change
highlighted in graph).
79. Id.; The World Bank, DataBank: World Development Indicators, Armed Forces
Personnel, total, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-developmentindicators (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (the World Bank reports 1,473,000 in 2004, and the PEW
graph shows 1,340,533 in 2015).
80. Forecastnumber of military retireesin the USfrom 2017 to 2027 (in 1,000), STATiSTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/217354/forecast-number-of-military-retirees-in-the-us/
(last visited
Oct. 1, 2018).
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Africa, and other hot spots around the world. 81 The United States is already
the largest contributor of personnel to the U.N. Secretariat, with many of
these employees working in the Diplomatic Security Section.82 While the
U.S. unemployment rate may fluctuate, a number of veterans consider their
service as their job especially in comparison to their current employment.83
Specifically, a 2010 survey found that the four services ranked in the top ten
places to work, beating out Microsoft, Johnson and Johnson, and Disney.84
Professor Bradley Brummel noted that "the military provides many of the
essential elements to finding happiness at work, including having a
meaningful impact on the world, having true camaraderie with your coworkers and having the opportunities to develop skills."85 It would seem that
such highly trained and motivated individuals could easily supply up to a
quarter or more of a contemplated 20,000- member U.N. force.
But little known constitutional and statutory provisions present potential
obstacles that must be addressed before U.S. citizens could make such a
contribution. The first is the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution,
which states that "no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the
United States], shall, without the consent of Congress accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince,
or foreign State."86 Emolument has been defined as "profit arising from
office or employment; that which is received as a compensation for services
...[such as salary]."87 Additionally, the nineteenth century Neutrality Acts
make it illegal for a U.S. citizen to "enlist[] . . . or to go beyond the
jurisdiction of the United States ... to be enlisted ... in the service of any
foreign prince, [or] state . . . as a soldier or as a marine or seaman . . ."S
81. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom: Demographics and Impact, in
RETURNING

HOME

FROM

IRAQ

AND

AFGHANISTAN:

PRELMINARY

ASSESSMENT

OF

17, 17 38
(Inst. of Med. Comm. on the Initial Assessment of Readjustment Needs of Military Pers.,
Veterans, and Their Families, 2010).
82. The Secretary- General, Composition of the Secretariat:staff demographics, U.N. Doc A/72/
123 (July 11, 2017); Denis Fitzgerald, f14here Do the 41,000 People Working for the U.N.
Secretariat Come From, U.N. TRIBUNE (Mar. 3, 2016), http://untribune.com/where-do-the41000-people-working-for-the -un-secretariat-come -from/; see generally William J. Durch &
Michelle Ker, Police in U.N. Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment, INT'L
PEACE INST., (Nov. 2013), https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi-e-pubpolice in un peacekeeping.pdf (Most U.N. Police come from Jordan, Bangladesh and India,
but of course the function of the contemplated armed forces would be far beyond routine police
duties.).
83. See Brian Anthony Hernandez, US militariy beats out Disney as happy place to work, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 25, 2010), https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/LatestNews-¥ires/2010/1025/US-military-beats -out-Disney-as-happy-place-to-work.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
87. Apple v. County of Crawford, 105 Pa. 300, 303 (1884) (quoting definition of emolument
from Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (n.d.)).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 958 960 (1994).
READJUSTMENT NEEDS OF VETERANS, SERVICE MEMBERS, AND THEIR FAMILIES
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Finally, the Immigration Acts provide for loss of U.S. nationality if a U.S.
citizen "enter[s] or serv[ed] in the armed forces of a foreign state . . . as a
commissioned or non-commissioned officer . . . .89
At first glance, the archaic wording of the Emoluments Clause might
appear to have little practical importance in the twenty first century. But in
light of judicial and administrative opinions, as well as the new military
retirement system, it could potentially apply to a sizable portion of all U.S.
military veterans. In 1883, the Supreme Court held that "officers of the
army on the retired list are [still] a part of the army of the United States
.... "90 Relying on this and subsequent case law, the Attorney General in
1909 extended this finding to enlisted men, concluding the following: "The
military status, whether that of an officer or enlisted man, is an office or
fundamentally like one. The quoted language is therefore directly applicable
to the case of a military officer and is applicable either directly or by analogy
to the case of an enlisted man."91
In 1922, the Comptroller General of the United States, referring to the
Dual Office Act of 1894, found that:
Enlisted men on the retired list are now as much a part of the Army or
Navy, respectively, as . . . commissioned or warrant officers are .... I
see no grounds for distinction .... The term office as used in the act of
1894 is a broad [sic] general term which has been construed to include
any person holding a place or position under the government and paid
from government funds.92
According to Major Joseph P. Creekmore in his extensive article on
military status, by the end of World War II, the concept of "office of an
enlisted man on the retired list" had solidified and become firmly
entrenched as a rule in administrative opinions considering the
applicability of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 (the Emoluments Clause),
to retired enlisted persons, as being an "office under the United
States. "93
Jeffery Green in his 2013 article, Application of the Emolument Clause
to DOD Civilian Employees and Military Personnel, appears to concur,
noting that: "This prohibition [now] applies even after retirement ....
[R]eservists are also subject to the Emoluments Clause, even after
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1481, 3a (1988).
90. Wood v. United States, 107 U.S. 414, 417 (1883).
91. Army Officers-Retirement- Contract Surgeons Employed During the Civil War, 27 Op.
Att'y Gen. 468, 472 (1909) (relying on United States v. Grimly, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Wood v.
United States, 107 U.S. 414 (1883); Hartwell v. United States, 6 U.S. (1 Wall.) 385 (1868)).
92. Director United States Veterans Bureau, 1 Comp. Gen. 700, 702 (1922).
93. Major Joseph P. Creekmore, Acceptance of Foreign Employment by Retired Military Personnel,
43 MIL. L. REv. 111, 128 29 (1969).
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completing the requisite number of years to be eligible for retired pay
94
and having been transferred to inactive status."
An analysis of the recently enacted military retirement system would
bolster these conclusions as officers and enlisted members both may have
lengthy military obligations after active duty and all are now eligible to
receive government funds for life. 95 Members of the armed forces today are
committed for a minimum of eight years. 96 This means that if they serve on
active duty for three years, then they may still be recalled to duty as a
member of the Individual Ready Reserve for five years. 97 Further, if they
serve at least twenty years and receive retirement pay, then they may be
called to active duty for life.98 Under the new U.S. Uniformed Services
Blended Retirement System, however, anyone who has served, no matter
how short their term on active duty, "can [now] get automatic and matching
Thrift Savings Plan contributions .. .in addition to monthly annuities for
life."99 This, in combination with the previous administrative opinions cited
above, suggests that virtually all veterans can receive continuous payment
from the U.S. Government and are potentially almost always holding an
"office of profit" in the United States.
But is an international organization like the U.N. a "foreign state" under
the constitution's Emoluments Clause? Surprisingly, the answer is not clear.
In 1957 the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Army advised a retired
officer who was considering accepting a position with the United Nations
Technical Assistance Administration that the Emoluments Clause could
preclude such employment because "the character of the United Nations
might justify the conclusion that it is a 'foreign state' within the meaning of
the constitutional provision."100 This position was confirmed byJAG a year
later with respect to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, although it was noted the Department of Justice would
eventually have to make a final determination. 10, In 1977, the Foreign Gifts

94. Jeffrey Green, Application of the Emoluments Clause to Department of Defense Civilian
Employees and Militaiy Personnel, U.N. Ai 'iy LAw., June 2013, at 16 17.
95. Ann Cams, Military IsOverhauling Its Retirement Systems, N.Y. TVIES (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/your-money/military-pensions-thrift-savings-plan.html.
96. Rod Powers, US Military Enlistment Contracts and Enlistment Incentives, BALANCE CAREERS,
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/what-the-recruiter-never-told-you-3332715
(last updated
Aug. 22, 2018).
97. Id.
98. Powers, supra note 96.
99. The U.S. Uniformed Services Blended Retirement System, DEP'T DEF. (Dec. 2015), https://
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab /2OB / 2OBlended / 20Retirement /20
Systemo201nfographic-12.9.15_FINAL3_508 %20(1).pdffver=2016-04-21-073227-327.
100. Creekmore, supra note 93, at 147.
101. Id.
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Act' 02 was amended to include international organizations under the
definition of "foreign government."103
In 1953, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice
had indicated there would be no problem with a federal judge serving on a
U.N. International Law Commission because such organizations were
unknown when the framers had drafted the Emoluments Clause.04 Later,
the OLC expressed doubt about this conclusion with regards to the U.N.,
noting that "employment by the United Nations Secretariat contains
elements comparable to accepting an office from a foreign government."I 0
In the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, there was "some basis for
regarding United Nations employment as coming within the spirit if not the
letter of the prohibition of Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the
Constitution."106

The Office of Legal Counsel appeared to reverse its position again with a
2001 opinion on the World Bank. The OLC stated that "[i]n recent years,
this Office in oral advice has consistently construed the terms 'King, Prince
or foreign State' to exclude international and multinational organizations"
although our "few formal written opinions, going back to the 1950s, have
not shown the same consistency."07 With regards to the World Bank, the
OLC stated that this U.N.-sponsored international financial organization
"has neither a defined territory nor a permanent population under its
control."108 The United States appoints a governor for the bank as well as an
executive director, and "by tradition[,] the World Bank's President is a
national of the United States, which is the World Bank's largest
shareholder."109 Based on these facts, the Bank's "important role in carrying
out our foreign policy," and the United States' "leadership role in its
decisionmaking[,] . . .employment ... would not directly raise the concerns
about divided loyalty that the Emoluments Clause was designed to
address."10
There are obvious contradictions implicit in these OLC opinions with
respect to servicepersons serving in a U.N. Peace Force. On the one hand,
the OLC has provided consistent oral advice that the Emoluments Clause
does not apply to international organizations, which have neither a defined
territory nor a population, and acknowledges the restriction cannot apply
because such organizations did not even exist in 1789. Furthermore, at least
in the case of the World Bank, there is likely to be little conflict between this
102. Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7342 (2011).
103. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, PL 95-105, 91 Stat 844, 863

(1977).
104. Emoluments Clause and the World Bank, 25 Op. O.L.C. 113, 115 (2001).
105. Id. at 115.

106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 114 115 (emphasis added).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 113.
Emoluments Clause and the World Bank, supra note 104, at 116. (emphasis added).
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international organization and U.S. policy because the United States has
such control over decision-making. On the other hand, the United States
does not control the leadership of the entire U.N. as a reliable instrument of
U.S. foreign policy as it does the World Bank, a fact aptly demonstrated by
numerous U.N. decisions, from the second Gulf War"' to the official and
widespread condemnation of the U.S. announcement that it would move its
embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.112 The OLC could thus in the future treat
the U.N. as a foreign state and find that employment with various U.N.
organizations other than the World Bank actually comes within "the spirit if
3
not the letter" of the Emolument clause."
The Emolument Clause does, however, state that such employment is
prohibited "without the consent of Congress," so any ambiguity reflected in
these opinions could be resolved with congressional legislation."4 In 1982,
Congress passed a law specifically referencing the Emolument Clause and
consenting to the civil employment of retired servicepersons with a foreign
government only "if the Secretary concerned and the Secretary of State
approve." 5 This was followed by legislation applicable to "retired
member[s] of the uniformed services" accepting employment or holding
office in the "military forces of a newly democratic nation" if the Secretary
of the service-member's former branch and the Secretary of State "jointly
determine whether a nation is a newly democratic nation" and "approve the
employment or holding of such office or position."116 If the Department of
Justice were to reverse its most recent oral and written opinions suggesting
that international organizations are not a "foreign state," Congress would
have precedent for passing legislation that would open the door and
eliminate the problem.
As for the Neutrality Acts pertaining to accepting a commission or
enlisting in the service of a foreign state," 7 completely aside from the
previous discussion on the meaning of "foreign state," a close reading of the
statutes reveals that they refer to recruitment "within the jurisdiction" of the
United States," 8 or "within the United States."" 9 The Supreme Court in
Wiborg v. United States held that these statutes did not apply to someone who
went abroad to enlist as long as they were not hired in the United States.120
Signing up at U.N. Headquarters would not be a problem, as the U.N. is
111. MARK WESTON JANiS & JOHN
COMMENTARY 777 (5th ed. 2014).

E. NOYES,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW,

CASES

AND

112. Rick Gladstone & Mark Landler, U.N. General Assembly Condemns U.S. Decree on
Jerusalem, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/world/middle
east/trump-jerusalem-united-nations.html.
113. Emoluments Clause and the World Bank, supra note 104, at 115.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
115. 37 U.S.C. § 908(a) (b) (2012).
116. 10 U.S.C. § 1060 (a) (c) (2003).

117. 18 U.S.C. §§ 958 60 (1994).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 958 (2011).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 959 (1994); 18 USC § 960 (1994).
120. Wiborg v. United States, 16 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1896).
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"InternationalTerritory."12 The Neutrality Acts have not been an obstacle
to many American citizens who have recently joined the Israeli and
Australian armed forces.122 It would be treason, however, if the soldier
found themselves in a position where they would "lev[y] war" against the
'
United States "or adhere to [our] enemies, giving them aid and comfort."123
Finally, it is fairly clear today, that despite some of the original language
of the Immigration Code pertaining to loss of nationality when entering the
armed forces of a foreign state, 24 a U.S. national will not automatically lose
their citizenship when entering another nation's army. This was not always
the case as the U.S. statutes and the Supreme Court were at one time fairly
strict in enforcing the loss of citizenship on those who engaged in a list of
prohibited acts including foreign service. 125 In 1958, the Supreme Court
held that it was proper for Congress to require that anyone who voted in a
foreign election should immediately lose their U.S. citizenship.126 This was
part of Congress' ability to regulate foreign affairs and avoid potential
diplomatic embarrassment.12 7 Just nine years later, however, in Afroyim v.
Rusk,128 the Court held that citizenship was not fleeting and could not be lost
without voluntary and intentional renunciation.129 Title 8 U.S.C. 1481 (a)(3)
thus now:
provides for [the] loss of nationality if a U.S. national voluntarily and
with the intention of relinquishing U.S. nationality enters or serves in
the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in hostilities against the
United States or serves in the armed forces of any foreign country as a
commissioned or non-commissioned officer.130
121. Lynn Freehill-Maye, The InternationalTerritory in the Middle of New York, MENTAL FLOSS
(Dec. 2, 2016), http://mentalfloss.com/article/89319/international-territory-middle-new-yorkcity.
122. Dan Lamothe, How Can Americans"be Fightingfor Israel in Gaza? Some Background, WASH.
POST (July 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/07/2 1/howcan- americans-be -fighting-for-israel -in-gaza-some -background/?utm term=.ad396aee69c5;
Lauren Raab, fWhy Would an American join Israel's Military?,L. A. TMES (July 21, 2014), http://
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-fg- americans -israel -gaza-military- 201407 21 -story.html;

Seth Robson, Serving Down Under: Australia Offers Military Jobs to US Troops FacingSeparation,
STARS & STRIPES (May 8, 2012), https://www.stripes.com/news/serving-down-under-australia-

offers -military-jobs -to-us-troops-facing-separation- 1.176622.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2012).
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 801(a) (d) (repealed 1952).
126. Perez v. Brownell, 78 S.Ct. 568, 568 69 (1958).
127. Id. at 576.
128. Afoyim v. Rusk, 87 S.Ct. 1160 (1967).
129. Id. at 1665.

130. Bureau of Consular Affairs, Advice About Possible Loss of U.S. Nationality and Dual
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/contentltravel-old/en/legal-considera
tions/us-citizenship-laws -policies/citizenship-and-dual -nationality/citizenship-and- foreign-mili
Nationality,

tary-service.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
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In adjudicating loss of nationality cases, the State Department has
"established an administrative presumption that a person serving in the
armed forces of a foreign state not engaged in hostilities against the U.S.
does not have the intention to relinquish nationality."' 131 The
aforementioned soldiers who are citizens of the United States serving in the
armed forces of Israel, Australia, and other nations thus do not generally lose
U.S. citizenship.132 This should not be a problem for veterans serving with a
U.N. Peace Force except in the very rare, and hopefully unimaginable, case
that the U.N. was somehow engaged in hostilities against the United States.
III. Would Deployment of Such a Force Need Congressional
Authorization?
If U.S. military veterans are still technically U.S. troops because they
"hold an office of profit" in the United States pursuant to the cited Attorney
General's and Comptroller's opinions and the new retirement system
providing for retirement for life, can they be deployed in a U.N. peace force
without congressional approval? This gets into a war powers issue that has
bedeviled scholars and politicians for decades. 133 Plenty has already been
written on the subject and it is beyond the scope of this paper to embark on a
complete recitation of the numerous lengthy arguments. But, it is important
to review the essence of the matter.
A bare reading of the U.N. Charter would support the position that once
the Security Council decides to use force, the United States and other
nations are then obligated to supply troops. Article 42 of the Charter states
that if other measures prove inadequate, the Security Council may decide to
"take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security.' 134 Article 25 of the Charter
states that "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter."135 This could be the end of the discussion. But Article 43 states
that members "undertake to make available to the Security Council .. .in
accordance with ... agreements, armed forces ... necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security." These agreements "shall
be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
131. Id.
132. Lamothe, supra note 122.
133. Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 21
(1995); Fred L. Morrison, Characteristics of InternationalAdministration in Crisis Areas: A View
from the United States of America, 54 Am.J. COMP. L. 443 (2006); James A.R. Nafzinger &
Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII
of The United Nations Charter, 46 Am.J. COMP. L. 421 (1998); Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking
War Powers: Congress, The President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597 (1993); Timothy
D.A. O'Hara, Without justification: Misplaced Reliance on United Nations Security Council
Resolutions for PresidentialWar Making, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583 (1998).
134. U.N. Charter art. 42.
135. U.N. Charter art. 25.
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respective constitutional processes."136 Depending on interpretation, Article
43 is either an anachronistic red herring completely irrelevant to the legal
deployment of troops mandated by Article 42 and Article 25,137 or the sine
qua non establishing the absolute necessity of "agreements" sanctioned by
Congress before U.S. forces may be utilized.138
When the U.N. Charter was submitted to the Senate for ratification as a
treaty, many Senators appeared to believe in the necessity that Article 43
agreements must be sanctioned by the legislature before U.S. troops could
be dispatched. 139 John Foster Dulles, the State Department advisor to the
U.S. delegation in San Francisco, testified that such agreements would need
the approval of the Senate and could not be done unilaterally by the
President.140 Congress subsequently passed the U.N. Participation Act
(UNPA) stating that:
The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the
Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order
to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such
special agreement or agreements the armed forces .. .provided [for]
therein: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as
authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the
Security Council for such purpose armed forces .. .in addition to the
141
forces . . . provided for in such special agreement or agreements.
Thus, in the opinion of Louis Fisher and others, it is only after "the
President receives the approval of Congress for a special agreement [that] he
does not need its subsequent approval to provide military assistance under
Article 42 .. .[N]othing in the [UNPA] is to be construed as congressional
approval of [any] other agreements entered into by the President."142 James
A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise point out that "no such special
agreements have ever been concluded ...under Article 43 of the [U.N.]

Charter. "143
Proponents of Security Council and presidential power could argue,
however, that the UNPA only related to the process of negotiating Article
43 "agreements," and that this is a matter separate and apart from the
obligations created by Article 42 and Article 25. Indeed, this appeared to be
the position of President Truman when he ordered U.S. forces to Korea in
136. U.N. Charter art. 43, TT 1, 3.
137. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order
Changeth", 85 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 63 (1991).
138. Nafzinger & Wise, supra note 133, at 430.
139. The Charter of the U.N.: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong.
645 646 (1945).

140. Id. (statement of John Foster Dulles, Advisor to U.S. Delegation in San Francisco, State
Department).
141. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-264, ch.583, § 6, 59 Stat. 619,
621 (1945) (first emphasis added).
142. Fisher, supra note 133, at 29; see also O'Hara, supra note 133.
143. Nafziger & Wise, supra note 133, at 429.
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1950 without Congressional authorization.144 The President stated: "The
Security Council called upon all members .. .to render every assistance to
the United Nations in the execution of this resolution [to defend South
Korea]. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea
forces to give the [South] Korean Government troops cover and support."'145
Secretary of State Acheson claimed the deployment was "under the aegis of
the United Nations"146 and "in conformity with the resolutions of the
47
Security Council.'
President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton appeared to be of the
same belief as President Truman. President Bush initially made the decision
to deploy troops to the Gulf to defend Kuwait without seeking
Congressional authorization.48 He eventually sought a congressional
authorization of force for political reasons, but at the same time stated that
he had the constitutional right to unilaterally implement the U.N.
resolutions. 49 President Clinton prepared for a large scale invasion of Haiti
in 1994 without congressional permission in order "to carry out the will of
the United Nations.150 When the unanimous Senate claimed that the U.N.
Haiti resolution was not constitutional authorization,' 51 Clinton responded
that he believed "[l]ike [his] predecessors of both parties," that the
Constitution did not require him to receive congressional approval to fulfill
a U.N. resolution.152
This approach is arguably directly in conflict with the UNPA as well as
the War Powers Act (WPA) requiring the President to receive congressional
permission within sixty days of sending our forces into hostilities.53 The
fact that the U.N. Charter is a Treaty would not necessarily avail the
President, as the WPA states that authority to introduce forces into
hostilities "shall not be inferred ... from any Treaty ...unless such treaty is
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of
United States Armed Forces."' 154 The UNPA certainly does not specifically
authorize a significant use of such forces. A major deployment, therefore,
could easily provoke a constitutional crisis in which the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer would be a crucial
part of the analysis.55 Youngstown famously held that when the President
acts inconsistent with Congress' express will, "his power is at its lowest ebb,"
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Fisher, supra note 133.
Id. at 32.
23 State Dept. Bull. 43, 43 (1950).
Id. at 46.
O'Hara, supra note 133, at 590.
Id,

150. Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 WEEKLY

COMP. PRES. Doc. 1779, 1780 (Sept. 15, 1994).
151. 103 Cong. Rec. S10540 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1994).
152. The President's News Conference, 30 Weekly Comp. Press Doc. 1614, 1616 (Aug. 3,
1994).
153. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1544(b) et seq.
154. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(2).
155. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952).
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and "he can only rely upon his constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."156
But aside from the fact that most Presidents have maintained that the
WPA is unconstitutional, 157 we are not dealing here with the deployment of
a major part of the standing U.S. Army, but rather with U.S. veterans as part
of a U.N. peacekeeping force. President Truman appeared to be thinking of
his constitutional ability to use U.S. troops in a limited role when he initially
called the assignment of forces to Korea a "police action."58 After the WPA
was passed, President Clinton deployed a brigade sized unit to Kosovo
despite Congress' refusal to authorize action,5 9 and President Obama
conducted an air war in Libya without seeking legislative permission on the
grounds that there was a limited mission, danger, or risk of escalation.60
Indeed, Presidents have ordered some type of military deployment in U.S.
1 61
history over 200 times with only five congressional declarations of war. At
least in this type of restricted action, the President appears to be backed up
by both history, which is a factor in Youngstown analysis,62 as well as such
Supreme Court cases as Cunningham v. Neagle, referring to the President's
unilateral "rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the constitution
'
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied,"163
and
United States v. Curtis Wright Exporting Co., highlighting the President's
"delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . .as the sole organ of the federal
'
government in the field of international relations."164
IV.

Conclusion

As noted in the first section of this paper, it was the intent of the founders
of the U.N. that some force would always be ready to maintain and restore
international peace and security. It was originally envisioned that these
forces would be supplied by nation states. The Cold War and the inability
of nations to agree to always provide well trained national troops
immediately upon U.N. request has extinguished this vision. The result has
been the horrors of Rwanda and the Balkans, which are now being followed
by despotic actions and ISIS inspired atrocities on the African continent. It
is understandable that democracies do not want to send active duty armies to
some of these dangerous hot spots, but, where there is a good chance of
success, a permanent U.N. force could be deployed without the same
political repercussions. The time has truly come for such a force. Statesmen
156. Id. at 871.
157. Morrison, supra note 133, at 452.
158. Presidential News Conference, 179 PUB. PAPERS 502, 504 (June 29, 1950).
159. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
160. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong.
(2011).
161. O'Hara, supra note 133, at 601.
162. Youngstown, 72 S.Ct. at 872.
163. Cunningham v. Neagle, 10 S.Ct. 658, 668 (1890).
164. United States v. Curtis Wright Exp. Co., 57 S.Ct. 216, 221 (1936).
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such as Sir Brian Urquhart and Hans Van Mierlo and scholars like Peter
Langille have now led the way. It is only necessary to act.
Troops for a permanent force could come from all over the world. Since
9/11, the United States has done an outstanding job training thousands of
young soldiers, who have also gained invaluable experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Many are now "retired" veterans. The author has often noted
in his conversations with these young veterans that they are proud of serving
in the military, partly because of the discipline, but also because, in Professor
Brumley's words, as soldiers, they were "having a meaningful impact on the
world."165 Any potential issues posed by their retirement pay and the
Emoluments Clause because they may still hold an "office of profit" in the
United States could be easily met with legislation in the same manner that
Congress acted to permit service with foreign and newly emerging
democracies in 1982 and 2003.166 Furthermore, if the retirement system still
technically makes them US troops, there exists plenty of precedent for the
veterans' deployment in narrow and limited peace-focused missions without
Congressional authorization, which is consistent with the President's
constitutional foreign affairs powers.
The creation of a U.N. Peace Force and the utilization of U.S. veterans to
continue their service in support of world peace and stability are two ideas
which simply make sense. We do not want to simply stand by and repeatedly
observe genocide as we did in Rwanda and the Balkans because nation states
and the U.N. were powerless to act.

165. Hernandez, supra note 83.
166. 37 U.S.C. § 908(a) (b) (2012); 10 U.S.C. § 1060 (a) (c) (2003).
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